Estate of H. Robert Greene v. Glucksman 669 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) Creditor brought action against debtor for defrauding creditor and her father estate of various monies and bonds, totaling over $300,000. Defendants were preliminarily enjoined from liquidating any money or assets belonging to plaintiffs. Out of state bank which was holder of bearer bonds filed motion to modify restraining order to prevent its application its application to bank on grounds that court lacked jurisdiction over it. The District Court, Lasker, J., held that bank which was non-party to fraud action did not act in concert with defendants with defendants and thus bank was not subject to preliminary injunction so as to prevent bank from liquidating a set of bearer bonds entrusted by plaintiff to defendant which were being held by bank as collateral for loans taken out by defendant. Bronx Store Equipment Co., Inc. v. Westbury Brooklyn Associates L.P., 16 A.D.3d 119, 791 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dept. 2005) The Appellate Division, First Department upheld a decision the Supreme Court made after trial which found a managing agent liable to a construction company for the debt of its principal on the ground that the managing agent had acknowledged and assumed the debt of the principal by clear and explicit evidence. Davis & Davis v. S & T World Products 154 A.D.2d 806, 545 N.Y.S.2d 806 (2d Dept. 1989) Designers of graphic art, putative licensors under alleged oral license agreement providing that licensees commission, sued putative licensees to cover damages. The Supreme Court, Queens County, Graci, J., denied putative licensees' motion to dismiss or grant summary judgment and putative licensees appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that: (1) putative licensors stated cause of action for accounting; (2) cause of action was not preempted by federal copyright law; (3) if it was proved that oral agreement allowed putative licensees to terminate at will, agreement was not subject to statute of frauds; and (4) material issues of fact as to existence of licensing agreement and at will termination provision precluded summary judgment. Recyclers Consulting Group v. IBM-Japan, Ltd. 1997 WL 615014 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) The District Court for the Southern District of New York remanded the case to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York because the Defendant's notice of removal was untimely filed. Peter v. P.P of New York, Inc. 1997 WL 473978 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted judgment on the pleadings and partial summary judgment based on Defendant's trademark infringement of Plaintiff's "Pure Platinum" trademark. Shahi Export House v. Mervyn's, Inc. 10 Misc.3d 1076, 814 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 2006) The Supreme Court denied a motion by defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there existed material issues of fact, including that Shahi may prove that it "rightfully relied on Mervyn's waiver of the failed wrinkle resistance tests." Davis & Davis v. S & T World Products 217 A.D.2d 645, 629 N.Y.S.2d 487 (2d Dept. 1995) Designers brought action against T-shirt manufacturer, and manufacturer appealed. the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that oral licensing agreement between designers and manufacturer, under which manufacturer agreed to pay designers 4% commission on all whole sales of T-shirts, did not violate statute of frauds. V. Marangi Carting Corp. v. Judex Enterprises, Inc. 171 Misc. 2d 655, 655 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1997) Waste removal company sued former customer, a restaurant, for breach of contract and competitor waste removal company for tortious interference with contract. The Supreme Court, New York County, Saxe, J., held that claim for tortious interference with existing contract for definite term, based on offer of better terms, could not be founded solely on offer made in the normal course of business, such as circulating flyers to potential customers. Chaline Estates, Inc. v. Furcraft Associates 278 A.D.2d 141, 718 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1st Dept. 2000) The First Department upheld the Supreme Court's appointment of a receiver of property.